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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW
MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS REQUIRES UNANIMOUS JURY
VERDICT, UNLESS DEFENDANT WAIVES RIGHT EFFECTIVELY. STATE v. MCKAY, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION

The court of appeals, in State v. McKay, 1 decided that an
accused may be convicted by a less-than-unanimous verdict where
he has waived the right to juror unanimity guaranteed by
Maryland's Declaration of Rights. 2 Both the court and the prosecution must agree to the waiver; further, it must meet constitutional
standards. 3
Johnny McKay, indicted for armed robbery and seven related
offenses, was tried before a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City. Judgment of acquittal was granted, at the close of the state's
case, on five of the eight charges. The three remaining counts were
submitted to the jury at the close of the defendant's case: the first
count (armed robbery); the third count (robbery); and the eighth
count (use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence).
After approximately one hour of deliberation, the jury returned.
The forelady announced that the jury had found the defendant "not
guilty" on count one, but was unable to reach a unanimous
agreement on the third count. Before the decision with respect to
count eight could be announced, the judge admonished the jury that
it was required to reach accord on all counts. Thereafter, the jury
was sent back for further deliberation. It returned ninety minutes
later and informed the court that a unanimous verdict still could not
be reached on the third count. 4
After consultation with his attorney, the defendant decided that
he would accept a majority vote on the third count. The following
colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: ... Under the law of this State you have a
right to insist upon a unanimous vote and if they do not
1. 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977).
2. MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 21, which provides:
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed
of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or
charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his" defence; to be allowed
counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process
for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath;
and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous
consent he ought not to be found guilty.
(Emphasis supplied).
3. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), where waiver is defined as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
4. Although it is not readily apparent from the court of appeals' opinion, the trial
court was informed at this time that a decision had been reached on the eighth
count. Record at 105-06.
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come in with a unanimous vote you have a right for retrial,
that is your constitutional right.
DEFENDANT MCKAY: What will that mean, I'll have to be
tried again?
THE COURT: Yes.
DEFENDANT MCKAY: The whole trial?
MR. BROCKMAN [Defendant's attorney]: The whole tria1. 5
And, later:
THE COURT: . . . I want to explain everything to you
because you have an absolute right under the law to have
the whole trial tried_all over again if you want to. 6
McKay, obviously under the mistaken impression that a new
trial would be required on at least three - or possibly all eight counts if the jury hung only on count three, 7 announced that he
would accept a majority vote. Inquiry was again made of the jury.
The forelady declared the verdict to be "not guilty" on count one,
nine-to-three for conviction on count three, and "not guilty" on
count eight. The defendant was sentenced to ten years on the third
count; from this judgment he sought relief in the court of special
appeals.
There, the defendant's conviction was reversed. 8 The court of
special appeals conceded that, by virtue of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Apodaca v. Oregon 9 and Johnson v. Louisiana,IO state
legislatures could constitutionally provide for non-unanimous
criminal jury verdicts. l l The issue, as the court perceived it, was
whether Maryland law so provided.
Two provisions of the Declaration of Rights govern trial by jury.
Article 5 asserts that: "[T]he Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to
the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the
course of that Law."12 Article 21 provides: "That in all criminal
5. 280 Md. 558, 560, 375 A.2d 228, 229 n.2 (1977).
6. McKay v. State, 32 Md. App. 451, 454, 362 A.2d 666, 669 (1976).
7. See Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701,319 A.2d 542 (1974), holding that once the trier of
fact in a criminal case has intentionally rendered a "not guilty" verdict, the
judgment is final, and an accused may not be retried on the same charge.
8. McKay v. State, 32 Md. App. 451, 362 A.2d 666 (1976).
9. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
10. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
11. The Oregon provision upheld in Apodaca allowed ten members of a jury to
convict in cases other than first-degree murder, where unanimity was required.
ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11. In Johnson, the controversy concerned a provision
which permitted a nine-twelfths verdict to convict, where the punishment for the
crime alleged was imprisonment at hard labor. Capital cases required a
unanimous twelve-man verdict; cases where the punishment imposed might be
imprisonment at hard labor required unanimity of a five-man jury. LA. CONST. of
1921, art. VII, § 41 (1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782 (1966) (amended 1974).
12. MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 5, which reads in full:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and
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prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be
found guilty."13 After a consideration of the federal constitutional
standards relating to criminal juries,14 as well as the aforementioned
Maryland provisions, the court held that the unanimous verdict was
not merely a right possessed by a Maryland criminal defendant, but
an absolute requirement that could not be waived. 15
On certiorari, the court of appeals agreed that the defendant's
conviction should be set aside,16 but not upon the court of special
appeals' rationale. Instead, Judge Levine, writing for the court, said:
"Although we think a unanimous jury verdict is a right guaranteed
the accused, which he can waive, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals because in this instance the waiver did not
meet constitutional standards."17
The court of appeals considered the decisions in Apodaca 18 and
Johnson 19 to be of especial significance, although these cases
construed requirements of the federal constitution.2O The court

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth
day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the
first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may
have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this
.Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or
repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland
are also entitled to all property derived to them from, or under the
Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert,
Baron of Baltimore.
MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 2l.
Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 of the federal constitution provides: "The Trial of all Crimes,
except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury." The sixth amendment asserts:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury."
In a footnote discussion near the end of its opinion, the court of special appeals
presaged the decision of the court of appeals when it said:
We observe that even if unanimity of the jury were a right which could
be waived by a defendant, we would have serious doubts that McKay's
actions constituted a valid waiver.... McKay sought to be bound by a
majority verdict of the jury because he was told by the court that the
alternative was "to have the whole trial tried all over again." He
obviously did not want to be retried on the armed robbery count . . . .
But once the jury, by unanimous verdict, acquitted him of that offense,
he could not be retried thereon. In the circumstances, we do not believe
that McKay can be said to have made an intelligent waiver.
32 Md. App. 451, 463 n.15, 362 A.2d 666, 675 n.15 (1976).
State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977).
Id. at 559, 375 A.2d at 228-29.
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
The appellant in Johnson relied primarily on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in arguing that the Louisiana provisions at issue did not
satisfy the "reasonable doubt" standard applicable to state criminal proceedings.
Apodaca, unlike Johnson, was tried after the Supreme Court's decision in
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maintained that since the federal constitution permits the states to
ordain less-than-unanimous verdicts even where an accused does not
give his consent, then the result should be no different where a
defendant does give his consent. Nonetheless, the applicable
Maryland constitutional provisions had to be addressed before the
court could resolve the issue facing it.
Initially, the court examined Article 5, providing for trial by jury
according to the English common law. According to the court, the
essential elements of the common law jury in England, at the time
the federal constitution was adopted in 1787, were thought to be:
1) That the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more
nor less; 2) that the trial should be in the presence and under
the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct
them as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts;
and 3) that the verdict shall be unanimous. 21

Moreover, waiver of jury trial was not permitted at English common
law. 22
The court of appeals, however, was cognizant of the judicial
gloss its predecessors had given Article 5 in the early case of State v.
Buchanan: 23
[Article 5] has no reference to adjudications in England
anterior to the colonization, or to judicial adoptions here, of
any part of the common law, during the continuance of the
colonial government, but to the common law in mass, as it
existed here, either potentially, or practically, and as it
prevailed in England at the time, except such portions of it
as are inconsistent with the spirit of [the Declaration of
Rights].24
Article 21, according to the court, was drafted in the context of
Maryland's colonial experience. During the colonial period, waiver of
the right to trial by jury was exercised as a matter of course;
recorded instances of such practice date back to a general assembly
act of 1642. 25 The court pointed out that ten- and eleven-man juries

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to trial by jury in federal criminal proceedings applicable
to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The appellant in Apodaca therefore rested his argument on sixth amendment
grounds. The Apodaca court split four-to-four over whether the sixth amendment
required jury unanimity in both state and federal criminal cases; Justice Powell,
the swing vote, thought unanimity to be a requisite only in federal prosecutions.
These essential elements were stated by the Supreme Court in Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. at 27-31 (1965).
5 H. & J. 317 (1821).
[d. at 358 (emphasis supplied).
I Archives of Maryland 151, 186 (1642).

134

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

sat occasionally to try civil cases in colonial Maryland and
concluded: "Thus, by 1776, Maryland had long since departed from
the English common law ... in permitting waiver of not only trial
by jury, but also at least one of its traditional elements, the 12-man
jury."26 The court observed that "there is no historical support ...
for an interpretation of Article 21 that would make jury unanimity
an imperative requirement as opposed to a right which can be
waived."27 The court cited other state constitutional provisions that
are waivable, provided the waiver is knowing and competent: the
right against self-incrimination;28 the right to trial by jury;29 the
right to a poll of the jury after verdict;30 the right to exclusion of
illegally seized evidence;31 the right to counsel;32 the right to
confrontation;33 and the right to a speedy tria1. 34 Judge Levine's
opinion continued: "If, therefore, all these fundamental rights can be
waived by the accused, there is no rationale for an interpretation
denying him waiver of unanimity, which, like all the rights just
enumerated, is generally regarded as existing primarily for his
benefit."35
The question of whether a criminal defendant might waive his
right to a unanimous verdict was one· of first impression in
Maryland. 36 In a civil action, the Maryland Rules permit the parties
to "stipulate that . . . a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of
the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury."37

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

280 Md. at 568, 375 A.2d at 233.
Id. at 569, 375 A.2d at 234.
Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 612, 39 A.2d 820, 824 (1944).
State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 14-19, 273 A.2d 156, 158-60 (1971).
Ross v. State, 24 Md. App. 246, 253, 330 A.2d 507, 511 (1975).
Jenkins. v. State, 232 Md. 529, 523-33, .194 A.2d 618, 620-21 (1963); Porter v.
State, 230 Md. 535, 536-37, 187 A.2d 870-71 (1963).
State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 575, 366 A.2d 1026, 1037 (1976). See State v.
Fowler, 259 Md. 95, 103-04, 267 A.2d 228, 233 (1970).
State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 79-81, 288 A.2d 163, 168-69 (1972).
Bonner v. Director, 237 Md. 445, 447, 206 A.2d 708, 709 (1965).
280 Md. at 570, 375 A.2d at 235.
The unanimity requirement has, however, been discussed in dicta in several prior
decisions. In Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1859), the jury foreman, upon being polled
after a "guilty" verdict had been rendered, responded: "Guilty of murder in the
first degree." Id. at 548. Thereafter, the eleven remaining jurors responded
merely, "guilty," without specifying degree. The court of appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction, reasoning: "Unanimity is indispensable to the sufficiency of the verdict, and this, we have seen, has not been in the case before us."
Id. at 548-49.
Williams v. State, 60 Md. 402 (1883) was decided upon a factual situation not
unlike that in Ford: a juror poll which was not specific as to the decided-upon
degree of murder. The court said the defendant "could not be convicted, except
upon the concurrence of each juror." Id. at 403.
Md. Rule 544, not applicable to criminal proceedings (see Md. Rule l(a)(l».
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Where trial is by a multi-judge -panel,3s unanimity is not
indispensable to a Maryland criminal verdict. In League v. State,39
the defendant was indicted for murder and tried by jury. The jurors
could not reach agreement, and were discharged. Upon reindictment,
the defendant elected trial by the court. A two-judge panel was
unable to agree upon a verdict. The defendant then moved for
dismissal, contending that the court's failure to agree constituted a
judgment of acquittal. The motion was denied, and upon yet another
trial a jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Affirmance
of the defendant's conviction was predicated on the grounds that:
[T]o make a legal verdict all the jurors must agree; but where
the matter is traversed before the court, if it is composed of
two or more members, a majority of them must concur in
rendering the judgment; and where there is an equal
division among them and no judgment is rendered, the party
is left in the same position as if no trial had taken place. 40

Sherrill v. State,41 on the authority of League, held that a threejudge panel, unlike a jury, need not reach a unanimous decision in
order to convict. The Sherrill court said: "Nothing in [Article 21]
supports the argument that a defendant who waives a jury trial
retains the right to a unanimous decision should he elect trial before
a multiple-judge court."42
II. THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Two other states - Texas and Kentucky - and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have been confronted
with the problem that faced the court of appeals in McKay.
Archer v. State43 is the earliest case. Perhaps owing to its
brevity, it has been omitted from discussion in subsequent decisions,
and was not cited by either Maryland appellate court in McKay.
In Archer, the defendant was tried for disturbing Sunday
school. 44 The jury was unable to reach accord. Thereafter, both the
state and the defense stipulated to abide by a majority decision. Four
of the jurors voted for conviction, and two for acquittal. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction,
38. See Comment, Unanimous Criminal Verdicts and Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 769 (1964), emphasizing that different considerations
are at work when trial is by a panel of judges, and suggesting that one reason
unanimity among judges is not required is because they are likely to weigh the
evidence more carefully than juries.
39. 36 Md. 257 (1872).
40. Id. at 266.
41. 14 Md. App. 146, 286 A.2d 528 (1972).
42. Id. at 157, 286 A.2d at 534.
43. 51 Tex. Crim. 46, 100 S.W. 769 (1907).
44. Punishment for this heinous crime was a fine of $25.
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asserting tersely: "There is no authority in Texas for less than a full·
jury rendering a verdict in either a civil or criminal case."45
In Hibdon u. United States,46 a two-count federal felony
prosecution, the jury returned after twenty-seven minutes of
deliberation, unable to agree on the defendant's guilt or innocence.
At the suggestion of the judge, both sides consented to a majority
verdict. Thereafter, the defendant was found guilty on both counts,
one by nine-to-three vote, and the other by ten-to-two.
In reversing the convictions on due process grounds,47 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
"entity" theory of jury verdicts 48 (an approach since explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Johnson 49 ):
[T]here cannot be a verdict supported by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remains reasonably
in doubt as to guilt. It would be a contradiction in terms
. . . . The right to a unanimous verdict cannot under any
circumstances be waived . . . . [I]t is of the very essence of
our traditional concept of due process in criminal cases. 5O
The Hibdon court acknowledged the imperative construction of
Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 51 providing:
"The verdict shall be unanimous." It noted that this rule was
promulgated sixteen years after Patton v. United States,52 in which
the Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that the jury trial guaranteed by
the sixth amendment "means a trial by jury as understood and
applied at common law,"53 including the requirement of a unanimous verdict. Further, the Hibdon court noted that proposed Rule 29(a)
of the First Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules had provided for
45 .. 51 Tex. Crim. at 46, 100 S.W. at 770.
46. 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
47. Judge Simons, who wrote the Hibdon opinion, never expressly mentioned the
fifth amendment, but made frequent reference to the constitutional requirement
of due process in federal criminal cases.
48. The entity theory treats the jury as an indivisible unit; "reasonable doubt" on the
part of even one juror is sufficient to pervade the entire jury and thus prevent
conviction. There is a logical inconsistency in this theory. If one juror's
reasonable doubt means the entire jury is reasonably in doubt, the defendant
should be acquitted. Instead, there is only a hung jury, and the defendant may be
retried.
.
49. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). The Supreme Court observed:
[T]his court has never held jury unanimity to be a requisite of due
process of law. Indeed, the Court has more than once expressly said that
"[I]n criminal cases due process of law is not denied by a state law ...
which dispenses with the necessity of a jury of twelve, or unanimity in
the verdict."
Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
50. 204 F.2d at 838.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 31(a).
52. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
53. Id. at 288.
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written stipulation by the parties to a majority verdict. This proposal
was rejected, due to strong opposition from judges and lawyers. The
court finally observed:
But even if ... this right [was waivable], we think that the
consent of the appellant. . . was not the free and unfettered
judgment of the accused. The suggestion for waiver. . . was
initiated by the judge after twenty-seven minutes of jury
deliberation. The accused was in prison serving another
sentence, his record was bad, the evidence of guilt, we must
assume, was substantial.54
In Ashton v. Commonwealth, 55 the defendant was convicted of
criminal libel, a misdemeanor. He consented to a majority verdict,56
which was returned ten-to-two for conviction. The relevant section of
the Kentucky Constitution read: "The ancient mode of trial by jury
shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject
to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution."57
A state criminal rule provided: "The verdict shall be unanimous."58
Another rule provided that, if upon the jury's poll, "there is not
unanimous concurrence, the verdict cannot be received."59
The Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to follow the Hibdon
precedent and affirmed the defendant's conviction. At the outset, the
court disagreed with Hibdon's interpretation of Rule 31(a), which
was similar to Kentucky R. Cr. 9.82. The court said:
A vast number of both civil and criminal procedural rules
are mandatory in form, but unless they are jurisdictional in
nature, or noncompliance will adversely affect the administration of justice, no reason is apparent why a party cannot
understandingly and voluntarily waive their requirements. 60
The court pointed out that, formerly, the defendant in a criminal
case was not permitted to waive rights intended for his protection
only because, at common law, an accused was not allowed to testify
on his own behalf, had no right to counsel, and usually faced a
severe penalty upon conviction. But since these harsh prohibitions of
the common law have been abolished,6! the court could find no
reason to deny waiver.
.'

54. 204 F.2d at 839.
55. 405 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1965).
56. It is not clear from the opinion when the majority verdict election was made or
what the circumstances were that convinced the defendant to elect it.
57. Ky. CONST. § 7.
58. Ky. R. CR. 9.82.
59. Id. 9.88.
60. 405 S.W.2d at 570.
61. See Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, 351-52, 124 N.W. 492, 494-95 (1910).
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III. DISCUSSION
The court of appeals' interpretation of the Declaration of Rights
provisions regarding jury trial was perceptive. Article 21 was
conceived as a codification of Maryland trial practices as they
existed in 1776. That trial by jury could be waived under the early
Maryland practice is indicative of a traditionally less rigid
adherence in the state to the English common law jury concept. 62 As
a former judge of the court of appeals, Carroll T. Bond, wrote:
"[There is a] need of an investigation of facts before any statement is
made that trial by jury in criminal cases was the only form known to
the early American law. It is possible to assume too close an
adherence to English practice in the colonies."63
The court of appeals omitted from its opinion some further
evidence of Maryland's infidelity to the common law notion of the
jury: the state constitutional enactment of 1851 64 authorizing juries
to be the judges of law, as well as fact, in the trial of criminal cases.
This provision has withstood constitutional scrutiny65 and remains
in force today.66 It reinforces the court of appeals' decision in McKay
and affirms the fact that a Maryland criminal jury possesses traits
uniquely its own.
As far as practical implications of McKay are concerned, it is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which waiver of juror
unanimity could redound to the benefit of an accused. 67 The hung
jury would always seem to be more advantageous to the criminal
defendant. The prosecution might drop the charges; key witnesses
often die or develop faulty memories. A hung jury is also a
bargaining chip in the hands of an accused. For example, where the
prosecution has refused to plea bargain at the outset of a case, it
may be forced to revise its position when the jury is unable to reach
accord.
62. Originally, waiver of jury trial in Maryland was employed only in misdemeanor
cases, and was in the nature of a "submission" to the court - a species of nolo
contendere. As the system developed, however, there were acquittals under this
submission practice. Not until 1809 was waiver actually encouraged by statute
Act of 1809, ch. 144. In 1821, the rule was extended to a felony case in State v.
Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317. By a legislative act of 1852, any criminal case could be
tried by the court alone if the defendant so desired Ch. 344, Md. Laws (1852).
See note 63, infra.
63. Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone,
Without Juries, 11 A.B.A.J. 699. 699 (1925). This article contains an extended
discussion of the development of the non·jury trial in Maryland. See also
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 n.45 (1970).
.
64. MD. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (1851).
65. See, e.g., Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 357 A.2d 503 (1973).
66. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
67. Waiver is, of course, a two-edged sword. Just as the defendant waives his right to
a unanimous verdict for conviction, so also does he eliminate the requirement of
a unanimous verdict for acquittal. A jury of twelve, where unanimity has been
waived, will hang only if the verdict is deadlocked at six-to-six.
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It has been suggested that disagreement among jurors usually
exists only when the majority favors conviction,6S and so no
defendant, when apprised of the fact that the jury is in disagreement, should opt for waiver of the unanimity guarantee. A recent
study is not entirely supportive of this view, however.69 Instead it is
suggested that the probability a jury will hang because a minority
favors acquittal is roughly equal to the probability that it will hang
because a minority favors conviction. 70
An accused may feel he has convinced the majority of a hung
jury and decide to gamble on a non-unanimous verdict. 71 The
defendant in a factual context similar to the one in which McKay
arose might find waiver tempting; where there are verdicts of
acquittal on every other count, one might well believe that the
majority on the hung count is likewise in favor of acquittal. 72
Nonetheless, the prosecutor's consent is necessary in order for
unanimity to be waived. If the prosecution thinks the majority of a
hung jury is in favor of acquittal, obviously no consent to the waiver
will be forthcoming. 73 Thus, McKay's brief in the court of appeals
reasoned that:

Since unanimity is required for an acquittal as well as a
guilty verdict, the state would have an interest in objecting
to any waiver of unanimity which might jeopardize its
chances of retrial. It is difficult to see how unanimity can be
designated a "right" when in all fairness the prosecutor
[has] this power to object. 74
The consent of neither the prosecutor nor the court is necessary
for an accused to waive trial by jury in a Maryland criminal case. If
the defendant elects trial by the court for tactical reasons 75 and
neither prosecution nor court consent is required, there is no
apparent reason why such consent should be required if, as a matter
of trial strategy, the defendant wishes to dispense with the
68. See, Note, Waiver of Jury Unanimity - Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt,
21 U. CHI. L. REV. 438, 446 n.60 (1954).
69. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1971).
70. Id. at 460.
71. One commentator has written that criminal jury trials are quite predictable, and
that the jury's decision can be foretold with about 90% accuracy. L. MOORE, THE
JURY 173 (1973).
72. If this was McKay'S belief, he was, of course, mistaken.
73. See, Note, Waiver of Jury Unanimity· Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21
U. CHI. L. REV. 438, 446 (1954).
74. Brief for Appellee at 4 n.4, State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977).
75. There are numerous reasons why an accused might prefer trial by the court over
a jury trial. A few considerations are: fear of juror prejudice; favorable
personality traits of a particular judge; or the fact that an accused has a known
criminal record or reputation which would likely cause hostility in a jury. See
Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone,
Without Juries, 11 A.B.A.J. 699, 702 (1925).
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unanimity guarantee. The court of appeals recognized this issue, but
addressed it unconvincingly: "We find no constitutional impediment
to conditioning a waiver of unanimity on the consent of the
prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to
consent, the result is simply that the jury must return a unanimous
verdict - the very right the Maryland Constitution guarantees the
accused. "76
Under the modem view, a criminal defendant may waive nearly
all privileges which have been constitutionally established for his
benefit.77 In determining what is and what is not waivable, the
crucial question would appear to be: Is the particular incident sought
to be waived a right personal to the defendant, or a limitation upon
the court's power to act?78 If it is a mere personal right - as is the
right to a unanimous jury verdict - waiver should be allowed.
Waiver of jury unanimity is admittedly a risky option and, most
likely, few defendants will ever exercise the right. Even where, in a
particular situation, waiver might seem to be a viable alternative to
the defendant, its tactical effectiveness is vitiated by the holding in
McKay. The requirement of prosecutorial and court consent renders
waiver of unanimity an illusory "right" in Maryland, and a tool of
limited practical utility to the criminal defense practitioner.

Robert A. Greenberg

76. 280 Md. at 572,375 A.2d at 235. Accord, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36
(1965) (applying the identical rationale to waiver of jury trial in federal cases).
77. See notes 28-34, supra.
78. The dictates of due process necessitate the preservation of certain rights which a
criminal defendant can never waive. For example, one cannot be punished for a
crime by voluntarily submitting to the court's jurisdiction; there must be a formal
accusation. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1926). Similarly, a defendant
cannot consent to trial by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. United
States v. Anderson, 60 F. Supp.' 649 (W.D. Wash. 1945).

